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76-3738

EYES ONLY

OTR 76-6574
26 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Harry E. Fitzwater
Director of Training

SUBJECT : Future Role of Training in the Agency
and the Intelligence Community

REFERENCE : Memo to DTR from DDA, dated 14 July 1976,
Same Subject (DDA 76-3494)

1. This is in response to the referent request to provide an OTR position on the proposed Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID). While the proposal may appear to have been generated by the Rodriguez paper, it is possible that it is merely a continuance of a Community approach that was pursued by [REDACTED]. This is suggested since the proposed DCID appears to have only a superficial relationship to the Rodriguez proposal of 7 April 1976.

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2. The draft DCID was a surprise to this Office. As you were informed, we were aware that the Intelligence Community Staff was considering a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] we understood that he concluded the program should be continued as in the past with the Agency accommodating other Community requirements as feasible. This conclusion was based on his concern that the [REDACTED] would be too difficult and costly to duplicate.

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3. There is one important procedural comment that should be made about the proposed DCID, particularly to the frequent reference to the "temporary" nature of the National Foreign Intelligence Training and Education Committee. Both the mission and functions statements -- particularly the mission -- are explicitly clear that if the Committee is to perform as indicated, it would be virtually permanent in nature. The faults and errors in the mission statement are that assumptions and actions are called for before necessary

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research and examination have been undertaken. The functions statement assumes that effectiveness and efficiency in "national foreign intelligence training and educational activities" need to be improved. It may be the case that "effectiveness and efficiency" need be improved, but a Committee that does not exist cannot know that for a fact. It is ironic that the Committee would be temporary, but it would be tasked before the fact with establishing a permanent National Foreign Intelligence Training and Education Council and Program.

4. Turning now to the ideas and substance that lie behind the draft DCID, certainly the idea of an Intelligence Community Staff oversight role appears to be consistent with the evolving nature of the intelligence structure within the Government. It may be that agencies within the Community are abysmally ignorant of each other's training needs and programs but, if this is the case -- which I do not believe is so -- the proposal starts at the wrong place. The IC Staff ought first to review the missions and responsibilities of each agency to identify similar operational activities before making any determination about training activities of common concern. No doubt, there are some activities which could and should be handled centrally. In CIA, these include activities which are responding now to Community requirements, such as information science, the

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there are others. One in particular that always comes to mind is language training. As you may know, a study of foreign language training in the U.S. Government was studied by the General Accounting Office, with support of the Office of Management and Budget, in 1974-75. The underlying presumption for this study was that, for efficiency and economy, much of language training should be consolidated. After more than a year of intensive study by some half-dozen investigators, they concluded that training was sufficiently specialized within agencies, making consolidation neither desirable nor economical. So they dropped the matter. The question would have continued to plague us had it not been investigated, so it may be with this proposal.

5. The possible "production" of doctrinal and instructional materials as suggested in the proposal is a "terrifying" prospect for the Agency and for OTR. It would probably have

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a paralyzing effect on OTR to be required to develop operational and analytical doctrine, instructional materials for Community-wide use, or otherwise be concerned with broad training standards. We are just too small with too many other requirements to devote much time and effort to this; I am advised that our past efforts have met with a kind of fatalism from the DDO and outright denial from the DDI that the "doctrine" for analytical functions can be developed.

6. The idea of centralizing the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) looks like an attempted steal. The Center represents, or should represent, CIA's efforts to develop better insight into the "processes" of intelligence and engage in long-range speculation about the future. It is highly doubtful that centralizing the Center functions in the IC Staff, or making the CSI a Community-wide group, would help advance either area.

7. In general, interagency cooperation in training activities should be sought by those directly involved in the effort and not by an additional stratum of authority and people. As you know from the minutes of our Unit Chiefs' Conference, this is one of our assigned tasks. I have been directly in touch with the heads of training in DIA and NSA, and will be seeing the Director of the Foreign Service Institute in the near future. The addition of another layer of staff personnel somehow always results in the diversion of operational personnel from substantive work to keep the staff personnel informed. In this time of reduced personnel resources, we need to be streamlined, not bureaucratized. In addition, I believe that the results of this concept will be the direct opposite of the intent. Duplication of effort and cost of training will far exceed that currently experienced. As requirements exceed the capacity of the Community's educational organization, and/or for simple convenience, components will set up their own training units bypassing the system.

8. In sum, the proposal simply makes too many assumptions regarding the need for a centralized approach to training and education in the intelligence field. Furthermore, it is too specific in what the Committee should do. If it is believed necessary that something be done, then a more logical instruction from the DCI might be to task a working group composed

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of representatives of OTR/CIA, DIS/DIA, NSA, the service intelligence agencies, and chaired by a member of the IC Staff to:

"In the interest of efficiency, economy and effectiveness, investigate the feasibility of more centralized approaches to training and education of U.S. Government personnel concerned in foreign intelligence collection, production and dissemination."

After this study is accomplished, then proceed to develop the specifics, which may turn out to be considerably different from those laid out in the paper. The IC Staff should be a catalyst in this effort. The approach should be selective rather than broad ranging. As the study proceeds, it might be that those proposing this super-organization may be surprised to learn how much interagency cooperation already exists in training matters of Community common concern.

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